In Tanisha Fazal’s book, State Death, she offers the theory that the world has adopted a “norm against conquest” in the post-Cold War era. International organizations, such as the UN, provide a resource for negotiation and conflict resolution. We no longer fear a world war and for the most part, do not hear of countries being annexed through a hostile or violent takeover.
Despite that the time of conquistadors and annexation is over, many nations are still battling severe violent internal conflict. Civil wars and genocides are not a thing of the past yet. Colombia, though politically strong, found itself facing extreme national insecurity on account of prolonged violent conflict. Much of the conflict was drug related, with powerful cartels taking control of political systems. In the 1980s, the strongest drug traffickers attempted to run for political office to gain impunity, but ended up being shut down. As the State attempted to threaten and extradite traffickers, the violence set in. The largest cartels, the Medellín and Cali cartels, threatened “bribe or bullet” to government officials – and followed through on those words. The late 80s saw the assassination of a presidential candidate, hundreds of judges, and two bombs.
The situation worsened and the government eventually negotiated a surrender policy with Pablo Escobar of Medellín. Escobar agreed to serve time in prison, but on his own territory. He was still able to conduct his drug business from prison and ultimately escaped for good in 1993. Once Escobar escaped, the State, with information from the Cali cartel and US intelligence, used a systematic decapitation strategy to eliminate Medellín. Once Medellín disbanded, the US pressured the Colombian president, Ernesto Samper, to take action against the Cali organization.
With the two major organized trafficking networks destroyed, Colombia hoped for relief from the violence. What they may not have realized was the subsequent development of “boutique” trafficking networks that sprung up. These networks did not hold enough power for mass violence, but the fragmentation of the system left them virtually free from government oversight.
In a way, I think Colombia experienced a degree of failure during the 1970s to 2000s. The central governing body lost control of its policies and in many instances, fell at the mercy of the drug trafficking organizations. Civilians felt endangered and insecure, given the prevalence of these violent networks. Other insurgent groups also compounded the violence in the State during this time. The State’s military could only offer moderate resistance to the FARC operations. Last week I mentioned violence and insecurity, and now we have two more factors: corruption of political institutions and inadequate military forces. Does the situation in Colombia represent a deviation from the “norm against conquest” mentioned by Fazal? Colombia wasn’t annexed by drug lords and the government wasn’t overthrown, but decapitation strategies were used to solve problems. On the whole, it might be hard to say that Colombia as a state deviates from the norm against conquest, but I believe that for the decades covered here, violent conflict represented straying from traditional strategies.
Next week we’ll see what happened to Colombia in the millennium with Plan Colombia. Could the State fix its failures of past decades?
Colombia: Geopolitics 